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Stunt Driving Law


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Stunt Driving On the 1st of October 2007 the Ontario Government enacted speeding laws for Stunt Driving, Racing and Speeding more than 50km/h. This law under Bill 203, the Safer Roads for a Safer Ontario Act has the following penalties;

Immediate seven (7) day driver’s licence suspension
Immediate seven (7) day vehicle impoundment
Minimum fine of two thousand (00.00) dollars
Maximum fine of ten thousand (,000.00) dollars
Drivers licence suspension of up to two years
Six (6) demerit points
Second conviction drivers licence suspension of up to ten (10) years
Imprisonment for a term of not more that six (6) months
100% Insurance Increase

Racing Stunt Driving

The definition of Stunt Driving and Racing includes;

Speeding more than 50km/h
Driving at a marked departure indicating a competition
Chasing another motor vehicle
Driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway (Careless Driving)
Driving in a manner that may endanger any person
Repeatedly changing lanes in close proximity to other vehicles so as to advance through the ordinary flow of traffic while driving at a rate of speed that is a marked departure from the lawful rate of speed.
Having been stopped and charged by the police for Stunt Driving / Racing the police officer will immediately suspend the drivers licence of the driver for seven (7) days. The driver cannot operate motor vehicle anywhere in the Province of Ontario. If the driver is caught by the police operating a motor vehicle they maybe arrested and charged with the offence of Drive While Suspended Highway Traffic Act of Ontario Section 53,1. The penalty for driving while under suspension is a one thousand dollar (00) fine, and six (6) months further licence suspension.

The motor vehicle used in the offence will be impounded by the police officer for seven (7) days. The vehicle will not be released to any person until the seven days have been completed, and includes even if the driver was not the owner of the vehicle.

The costs of the impoundment for Stunt Driving and Racing are the responsibility of the driver/owner which will be from five hundred to over one thousand dollars.

Having successfully fought hundreds of Stunt Driving Ticket OTT Legal knows how to help you, call 1-888-668-8946 or visit the OTT Legal office closest to you.
The police officer will issue to the driver a Part Three Provincial offences notice with a court date on it commanding the defendant to appear in traffic court before a Justice of the Peace.

The driver/defendant may hire an agent such as OTT Legal who will appear on the behalf of the driver. If the defendant fails to appear before the court the Justice of the Peace may issue a warrant for the driver to appear in court.

At traffic court the police officer will have a prosecutor hired by the municipality to assist the officer in prosecution the case. As many prosecutors are lawyers, drivers are wise to seek legal advise prior to appearing in court from OTT Legal.

Stunt Driving, Speeding, and Racing trials are won on legal technicalities properly presented by a person with experience and training in traffic court. Just going to court and explaining why you may have commented the offence will not get the charge dismissed.

OTT Legal offers a free consultation to discuss your Stunt Driving ticket with one of our licenced representatives. Many of our licenced agents are former Ontario Provincial Police and the Toronto Police Service Police Officers who have not only the court experience but the actually experience in radar, laser and speed enforcement in Ontario.

The Law for Stunt Driving and Racing in Ontario

Bill 203 falls under section 172 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act;

172. (1) Racing, stunts, etc., prohibited No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway in a race or contest, while performing a stunt on on a bet or wager.

(2) Offence – Every person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not less that ,000 and not more that ,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more that six months, or to both, and in addition his or her driver’s licence may be suspended,

(a) on a first conviction under this section, for not more that two years; or
(b) on a subsequent conviction under this section, for not more than 10 years.

(5) Police officer to require surrender of driver’s licence, detention of motor vehicle – Where a police officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that a person is stunt driving, or has driven, a motor vehicle on a highway in contravention of subsection (1) the officer shall,

a) request that the person surrender his or her driver’s licence; and

b) detain the motor vehicle that was being driven by the person until it is impounded under clause (7)(b).

(6) Administrative seven-day licence suspension – Upon a request being made under clause (5)(a), for stunt driving the person to whom the request is made shall forthwith surrender his or her driver’s licence to the police officer and,whether or not the person is unable or fails to surrender the licence to the police officer, his or her driver’s licence is suspended for a period of seven days from the time the request is made

(7) Administrative seven-day vehicle impoundment – Upon a motor vehicle vehicle being detained under clause (5)(a), the motor vehicle shall, at the cost of and risk to its owner,

(a) be removed to an impound facility as directed by a police officer; and

(b) be impounded for seven days from the time it was detained under clause (5)(b)

(8) Release of vehicle – Subject to subsection (15) the motor vehicle shall be release to its owner from the impound facility upon the expiry of the period of impoundment.

ONTARIO REGULATION 455/07 – Contests, Stunts, Racing

Report to Registrar

1.(1) A police officer who requests, under clause 172 (5) (a) of the Act, that a person surrender his or her driver’s licence for stunt driving or racing shall, before providing the person with the notice of suspension required by subsection 172 (10) of the Act, report the request and the following information to the Registrar:

The driver’s name
If known, the driver’s address, date of birth and driver’s licence number
The date and time of the request
The location at which the alleged offence under subsection 172 (1) of the Act took place

(2) The report under subsection (1) shall be made by any form of telecommunication.

(3) A police officer who has made a report under subsection for Stunt Driving (1) shall, as soon as practical after making the report, complete a form provided by the Registrar for that purpose and forward the completed form to the Registrar.

Definition, "Stunt Driving", "Race" and "Contest"

2.(1)For the purposes of section 172 of the Act, "stunt driving" "race" and "contest" include any activity where one or more persons engage in any of the following driving behaviors:

1. Driving two or more motor vehicles at a rate of speed that is a marked departure from the lawful rate of speed and in a manner that indicates the drivers of the motor vehicles are engaged in a competition.

2. Driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to chase another motor vehicle.

3. Driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway or in a manner that may endanger any person by,

4. Driving a motor vehicle at a rate of speed that is a marked departure from the lawful rate of speed,

5. Outdistancing or attempting to outdistance one or more other motor vehicles while driving at a rate of speed that is a marked departure from the lawful rate of speed, or

6. Repeatedly changing lanes in close proximity to other vehicles so as to advance through the ordinary flow of traffic while driving at a rate of speed that is a marked departure from the lawful rate of speed.

(2)In this section,

"marked departure from the lawful rate of speed" means a rate of speed that may limit the ability of a driver of a motor vehicle to prudently adjust to changing circumstances on the highway.

Definition, "Stunt Driving "

3.For the purposes of section 172 of the Act, "stunt driving" includes any activity where one or more persons engage in any of the following driving behaviors:

1. Driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to lift some or all of its tires from the surface of the highway, including driving a motorcycle with only one wheel in contact with the ground, but not including the use of lift axles on commercial motor vehicles.

2. Driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to cause some or all of its tires to lose traction with the surface of the highway while turning.

3. Driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to spin it or cause it to circle, without maintaining control over it.

4. Driving two or more motor vehicles side by side or in proximity to each other, where one of the motor vehicles occupies a lane of traffic or other portion of the highway intended for use by oncoming traffic for a period of time that is longer than is reasonably required to pass another motor vehicle.

5. Driving a motor vehicle with a person in the trunk of the motor vehicle.

6. Driving a motor vehicle while the driver is not sitting in the driver’s seat.

7. Driving a motor vehicle at a rate of speed that is 50 kilometres per hour or more over the speed limit.

8. Driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway or in a manner that may endanger any person by,

9. Driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to prevent another vehicle from passing,

10. Stopping or slowing down a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates the driver’s sole intention in stopping or slowing down is to interfere with the movement of another vehicle by cutting off its passage on the highway or to cause another vehicle to stop or slow down in circumstances where the other vehicle would not ordinarily do so,

11. Driving a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates an intention to drive, without justification, as close as possible to another vehicle, pedestrian or fixed object on or near the highway, or

iv. making a left turn where,

(A) the driver is stopped at an intersection controlled by a traffic control signal system in response to a circular red indication;

(B) at least one vehicle facing the opposite direction is similarly stopped in response to a circular red indication; and

(C) the driver executes the left turn immediately before or after the system shows only a circular green indication in both directions and in a manner that indicates an intention to complete or attempt to complete the left turn before the vehicle facing the opposite direction is able to proceed straight through the intersection in response to the circular green indication facing that vehicle.

Exceptions to Stunt Driving

4.(1)Despite section 2, "race" and "contest" do not include,

(a) a rally, navigational rally or similar event that is conducted,

(i) under the supervision of the Canadian Association of Rally Sport,

(ii) under the supervision of a club or association approved in writing by the Ministry, or

(iii) with the written approval of the road authority or road authorities having jurisdiction over the highway or highways used;

(b) motor vehicle owners engaged in a tour, scenic drive, treasure hunt or other similar motoring event in which the participants drive responsibly and in a manner that indicates an overall intention to comply with the provisions of the Act; or

(c) an event held on a closed course with the written approval of the road authority having jurisdiction over the highway, including any event lawfully using any of the trademarks "CART", "Formula One", "Indy", "IndyCar", "IRL" or "NASCAR".

(2)Despite sections 2 and 3, "race", "contest" and "stunt" do not include any activity required for the lawful operation of motor vehicles described in subsections 62 (15.1) or 128 (13) of the Act, or the lawful operation of an emergency vehicle as defined in subsection 144 (1) of the Act.

www.ontariospeeding.com/Stunt-Driving.html

Candidates Have a Legal Right to Lie to Voters


Image by Chuck “Caveman” Coker
Candidates have a legal right to lie to voters just about as much as they want. And some candidates take their rights very seriously.

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False Ads: There Oughta Be A Law! — Or Maybe Not

By Brooks Jackson

June 3, 2004 (Updated May 10, 2007)

Here’s a fact that may surprise you: Candidates have a legal right to lie to voters just about as much as they want.

That comes as a shock to many. After all, consumers have been protected for decades from false ads for commercial products. Shouldn’t there be "truth-in-advertising" laws to protect voters, too?

Turns out, that’s a tougher question than you might imagine.

For one thing, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says, "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech," and that applies to candidates for office especially. And secondly, in the few states that have enacted laws against false political ads, they haven’t been very effective.

Bogus Psychics & Twirling Ballerina Dolls

Laws protecting consumers from false advertising of products are enforced pretty vigorously. For example, the Federal Trade Commission took action in 2002 to protect the public from the self-proclaimed psychic "Miss Cleo," who the FTC said promised free readings over the phone and then socked her gullible clients with enormous telephone charges. The FTC even forced a toy company a while back to stop running ads showing its "Bouncin’ Kid Ballerina Kid" doll standing alone and twirling gracefully without human assistance, which the FTC said was video hokum.

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Federal Communications Act

(U.S. Code: Title 47, Sec. 315. – Candidates for public office)

(a) … If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.

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But there’s no such truth-in-advertising law governing federal candidates. They can legally lie about almost anything they want. In fact, the Federal Communications Act even requires broadcasters who run candidate ads to show them uncensored, even if the broadcasters believe their content to be offensive or false.

This is taken very seriously. In a 1972 case, the Federal Communications Commission forced stations in Atlanta, Ga., to accept a paid political ad from J.B. Stoner — a self-proclaimed "white racist" running for the U.S. Senate on the National States Rights party ticket. The NAACP objected to Stoner’s ad because it said the "main reason why niggers want integration is because niggers want our white women." The FCC sided with Stoner, citing freedom of speech decisions of the Supreme Court.

Stations can reject ads for any reason from political groups other than candidates. And they may reject ads from all candidates for a given office. But if they take ads from one candidate, they can’t legally refuse ads from opponents except for technical reasons (such as being too long or short to fit standard commercial breaks, or if the recording quality is poor) or if they are "obscene." Rejecting a candidate’s ad because it’s false is simply not allowed.

So what gives? Surely the public stands to suffer more damage from a presidential candidate lying about his opponent than from a bogus psychic. Isn’t the process of choosing the leader of the most powerful nation on the planet a more important matter than whether some doll really does what the TV ads show?

Yes. But …

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The First Amendment

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

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For one thing, the First Amendment guarantee of free speech poses a big obstacle to enacting or enforcing such laws — which it should. The very idea of self-government rests on the idea that voters — given enough uncensored information — can best decide who should be in power and who should not. So free speech applies first and foremost to candidates. As the U.S. Supreme Court said unanimously in a 1971 libel case, "It can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."

So states have found it hard to enact laws against false political advertising — and even harder to make them work.

Minnesota: The Case of the Furloughed Rapist

Example: In a 1994 House race in Minnesota, Republican candidate Tad Jude ran an emotion-packed ad against Democrat William Luther in the final weekend of the race.

It was reminiscent of the notorious "Willie Horton" ads run against Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election. In the Jude ad, the candidate cited the case of a woman and two daughters who were kidnapped and raped repeatedly over two days by a man who had been released from prison on a furlough.

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The False Ad That Couldn’t Be Outlawed

Announcer: In 1990, a Minnesota woman and her two daughters were abducted and repeatedly raped over a two-day ordeal. Despite two prior convictions, the perpetrator, Daniel Patten, was out of prison on a weekend furlough.
Patten may never have been released and this crime never committed had legislation authored by Tad Jude been enacted. But Jude’s bill was stopped by Bill Luther and his liberal friends in the Minnesota Senate. Bill Luther’s willingness to set violent criminals free is putting every woman in Minnesota in danger. Sending him to Congress would be a crime.

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Jude’s ad claimed the rapist "may never have been released and this crime never committed" if Democrat Luther, a state senator, had not blocked a bill sponsored by Republican Jude, who was also a state senator. "Sending [Luther] to Congress would be a crime," it concluded.

The ad was false. Even if Jude’s proposed legislation had been enacted, it could not possibly have prevented the crime it described. Reason: Jude’s bill would have applied only to persons imprisoned for offenses committed on or after August 1, 1987, and the convict mentioned in the ad had been sentenced in 1983.

Jude lost the election, but the ad may have had an effect. His losing margin was only 549 votes out of more than 200,000 cast.

It was Jude’s misfortune, however, to live in one of the very few states that outlaws false political advertising. A special prosecutor presented the case to a grand jury, which indicted Jude and his campaign manager. A conviction could have led to a year in jail and a ,000 fine.

Problems with Enforcement

The trial judge later threw the case out, however, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to reinstate the indictment against Jude. In its opinion, the appeals court said that the Minnesota law was too broad, allowing someone to be charged for having only "reason to believe" that an ad they helped prepare was false. The court said that U.S. Supreme Court rulings required a higher standard: evidence of "actual malice."

To convict, prosecutors would have to prove Jude either knew the ad was false or acted with "reckless disregard" for whether it was true or not. That would have been a tough job; Jude had testified to the grand jury that he was under the false impression that the ad was true, that the rapist named in the ad had been convicted later of a second offense that would have made him subject to the legislation he had proposed. So Jude went free and, in fact, ran against Luther a second time in 1996. That time Luther won with nearly 56 percent of the vote.

The case exposes two problems with relying on truth-in-advertising laws to protect voters from campaign falsehoods. First, prosecutors can’t move quickly enough to cure the damage caused by a last-minute, false attack. Jude wasn’t indicted until more than a year after the election that he almost won. And second, under the "actual malice" standard a candidate could lie profusely in ads and still get away with it by claiming he or she thought the ads were true, so long as no convincing evidence surfaced to the contrary.

Washington State: The Case of the Killer Ophthalmologists

Washington state also ran into problems trying to enforce its truth-in-political-advertising law after a 1991 ballot referendum fight. At issue was a proposed "death with dignity" law. A group opposed to it, the "119 Vote No! Committee," issued a leaflet saying that if the proposal passed it "WOULD LET DOCTORS END PATIENTS’ LIVES WITHOUT BENEFIT OF SAFEGUARDS . . . No special qualifications– your eye doctor could kill you."

The ballot proposition failed, and the state’s Public Disclosure Commission brought an action charging the 119 Committee with violating state law against false political advertising. The commission said the proposition did contain standards and it was false to say it would open the door to killer ophthalmologists. But the trial court dismissed the charges in this case, too, and the Washington State Supreme Court later struck down the law under which the committee had been charged.

The Supreme Court’s majority opinion questioned whether state government officials had any right to substitute their judgment for that of the voters in matters of political speech. Quoting earlier court opinions, it said:

Instead of relying on the State to silence false political speech, the First Amendment requires our dependence on even more speech to bring forth truth. … The First Amendment exists precisely to protect against laws such as [the Washington state truth-in-advertising law] which suppress ideas and inhibit free discussion of governmental affairs.

The Washington court wasn’t unanimous. A judge who dissented complained that the majority had become "the first court in the history of the Republic to declare First Amendment protection for calculated lies" and said that his fellow judges were "shockingly oblivious to the increasing nastiness of modern political campaigns."

At least one other state is enforcing a law against bogus campaign ads. But voters shouldn’t take much comfort from that, as the following case study shows.

Ohio: The Case of the Lying Treasurer

Ohio’s law has been tested in the courts and has survived, and the Ohio Elections Commission looks into 30 to 40 complaints each year, according to its executive director, Philip C. Richter.

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Taft’s False Ad: 1998

Announcer: The men and women of law enforcement — they want a governor who is tough on crime. Ohio’s police have endorsed Bob Taft for governor — and rejected Lee Fisher.

Our law officers back Bob Taft to expand Ohio’s drug courts and hold violent juveniles more accountable.

And Lee Fisher? As attorney general, Fisher cut crime-fighting employees by 15 percent, while increasing his PR budget to million.

Bob Taft for governor. That’s how it gets done.

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And the seven-member, bipartisan Elections Commission takes its job seriously, as demonstrated in a 1998 case involving a false TV commercial run by the Republican candidate for governor, Bob Taft, against his Democratic opponent, Lee Fisher.

The ad appeared Sept. 18. Fisher complained to the commission, which held hearings and decided the matter less than a month after the ad first aired — astonishing speed to anyone familiar with the usual pace of election-law enforcement. Richter told FactCheck.org that the commission wanted to decide the matter before voters went to the polls, and it met that deadline with more than two weeks to spare.

On Oct. 16 the commission announced its decision. By what it called "clear and convincing evidence" it ruled that the Taft ad violated Ohio’s law against false statements. The ad claimed Fisher, who had been the state’s attorney general, "cut crime-fighting employees by 15 percent," when in fact the number of credentialed investigators actually increased from 214 to 231 during his four-year tenure. Also, the Taft ad claimed "Ohio’s police have endorsed Bob Taft … and rejected Lee Fisher." Actually, the state’s Fraternal Order of Police had been split over its endorsement of Taft, and it didn’t represent all of "Ohio’s police" in any event.

But Taft paid no real penalty for the false ad, except for some unfavorable publicity. The Elections Commission issued only a letter of reprimand to Taft’s campaign treasurer and his campaign organization. The commission has no power to levy fines. In rare cases it forwards complaints to a prosecutor for possible criminal proceedings, but it didn’t do that in the Taft case. Taft went on to win the election easily.

Contrast this nearly toothless Ohio law with what the Federal Trade Commission was able to extract from Miss Cleo, who agreed to pay a million penalty to the government and also to give up claims of more than 0 million (yes, half a billion dollars) against her former "clients."

"Convicted of Lying?"

As if to underscore the futility of using government to regulate truth in politics, The Associated Press quoted Fisher’s campaign manager, Alan Melamed, after the commission’s decision was announced as saying: "Bob Taft has found his place in history. … He’s the first candidate for governor to be convicted of lying." That itself was a false statement. The commission specifically rejected Fisher’s complaints against Taft personally, and it has no power to "convict," a word that implies criminal violations.

And so it goes. All this should tell voters that — legally — it’s pretty much up to them to sort out who’s lying and who’s not in a political campaign. Nobody said democracy was supposed to be easy.

It is, of course, the job of news organizations to assist; that’s why the First Amendment guarantees a free press as well as free speech. We at FactCheck.org try hard to help. But on Election Day, it’s up to you.

Source: Jackson, Brooks. "False Ads: There Oughta Be A Law! — Or Maybe Not." FactCheck.org. 3 Jun. 2004, Updated 10 May, 2007. <http://www.factcheck.org/specialreports/false_ads_there_oughta_be_a_law.html>

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